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HOLY WRIT: INTERPRETATION IN LAW AND RELIGION.  Edited by Arie-Jan 
Kwak.  Ashgate 2009.  Pp. 204.  $99.95.  ISBN: 0-754-67896-2. 
Holy Writ: Interpretation in Law and Religion is precisely what its 
title suggests.  The book consists of “assembled essays on interpretation 
in the field of law and religion” (1) written by Justice Antonin Scalia 
and professors of law and philosophy from the University of Leiden and 
the University of Utrecht.  The genesis of the book was “a conference in 
the honour of Justice Antonin Scalia, who visited the Leiden law 
department to celebrate the opening of the new faculty building.” 
(Preface, ix)  The structure of the book makes it particularly enjoyable.  
The collection is aptly likened to a chain novel in the book’s preface.  
After an introduction by the book’s editor, Justice Scalia is given the 
first substantive word with his essay.  As the first author in the chain, 
Justice Scalia has little, if anything, to say about the essays that follow 
his.  However, the authors who follow Justice Scalia engage him and 
each other.  The result is a book laden with robust and informative 
discussions about many aspects of the interpretation of religious and 
legal texts. 
It should be made clear that Justice Scalia’s views are more of a 
point of departure for the authors rather than the focus of their 
comments.  Some of the essays discuss—in varying depth—Justice 
Scalia’s originalist views and some discuss—also in varying depth—
how Justice Scalia’s views apply to the United States and other 
democracies.  However, the book is less about Scalia’s originalism than 
it is about broader issues involving the interpretation of religious and 
legal texts.  Given that the authors of the essays are scholars based at 
European universities, it is not surprising that the authors do not discuss 
narrow points of American constitutional law particularly deeply.  Those 
who want an extended and close analysis of Justice Scalia’s 
interpretative views and their application to the U.S. Constitution may 
wish to look elsewhere.1  Similarly, those who want a book that explores 
the intricacies of Justice Scalia’s views regarding the interpretation of 
religious texts may be disappointed, though for a different reason.  In 
                                                          
 1. Some essayists attempt to engage the U.S. Constitution, with mixed results.  For example, 
Tom Zwart addresses unenumerated rights in the U.S. Constitution, but does so incompletely. 
(113-29).  
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one of the most illuminating and interesting sentences in the book, 
Herman Philipse noted in his essay: “In fact, Justice Scalia told me that 
he himself had never thought about the pros and cons of Textualism in 
theology.” (38) 
The collection of essays begins with Justice Scalia’s lecture he 
presented at the conference.  In the lecture, he spoke generally about the 
United States as a federation, comparing it to the European Union.  In 
addition, Justice Scalia discussed the United States Constitution as a 
legal document that provides legally enforceable rights.  He noted that a 
legal document should—by its very nature—be interpreted based on its 
meaning at the time of its creation, i.e., its original meaning.  It is 
important to note that he did not suggest that the Constitution should be 
read as a hortatory document that provides Americans with a way of 
living.2  Indeed, the essay says little about interpreting transcendent legal 
or religious documents.  What Justice Scalia wrote could have been 
written about any important, but not particularly special, legal document.  
However, he did indicate that the U.S. Constitution ought to be 
interpreted fairly sparely so that the judiciary does not usurp the power 
of the legislature.  Of course, that idea could stem as much from the U.S. 
Constitution’s structure of separation of powers as from any general 
principle of interpreting legal statutes or constitutions.  The breadth of 
ideas expressed in Justice Scalia’s essay provides a sensible starting 
point for much broader interpretative issues examined in the book’s 
remaining essays. 
Two broad overlapping issues, with numerous lesser issues, 
dominate the collection.3  The first issue involves the different ways 
religious and legal texts can be interpreted.  The second issue involves 
how those texts should be interpreted if they are to be used to resolve 
current problems.  The essays explore these issues in significant depth.  
However, the essays did not address a few issues that one might assume 
a collection of essays on the topic might mention. 
How texts can be interpreted is an issue of primary concern in this 
book.  The essays indicate that different methods of interpretation may 
be appropriate depending on the text to be interpreted.  These points are 
made quite carefully and thoroughly.  For example, the distinction 
between being a text-based interpreter and being a textualist is explained 
and debated.  Most interpreters would claim to be text-based.  However, 
                                                          
 2. Justice Scalia distinguishes the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights’ enforceable legal rights 
with the Declaration of Independence’s discussion of principles. (12). 
 3. Hans Nieuwenhuis’s essay contribution tracks these two issues quite closely. (131). 
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there is a difference between asserting that text matters and focusing 
almost solely on text to reveal its meaning.4  The contributors discuss 
that difference, as well as issues of originalism, intentionalism, literalism 
and other methods of interpretation in great depth and quality.  For 
example, in the context of considering whether the Bible ought to be 
taken more or less literally Paul Cliteur asks provocatively: “Is the Bible 
for the serious believer more like a poem or more like a penal code?” 
(77) 
The discussions regarding methods of interpretation occur in the 
context of analyzing both legal and religious texts.  The authors fairly 
evaluate Justice Scalia’s ideas, noting that his version of originalism or 
textualism focuses on original meaning.  That approach requires that a 
text’s interpreter determine what an average person would have 
understood the text to mean at the time the text was adopted.5  
The essayists’ precision is important and is a hallmark of the book.  
Precision allows the essayists to make important distinctions.  For 
example, proponents of original meaning are not necessarily proponents 
of intentionalism.  The intention of the Founders or draftsmen of any 
text may be relevant only as a piece of evidence to support what is the 
document’s original meaning.  Of course, this issue has particular 
salience for the U.S. Constitution, as it had to be ratified by those who 
may have read its terms somewhat differently than those who drafted it.  
The discussions of the different ways that texts can be interpreted are 
quite rich and could alone make for a nice primer for law students and 
quite a few law professors. 
At times, the broad issue of how to interpret texts becomes the 
issue of how and whether to use original meaning when applying a text 
to today’s problems.  Some of the essayists note that while the concept 
of original meaning is easy to understand, the meaning of terms ought to 
be contextualized, based both on the context of the text and on greater 
societal context.  For example, Hendrik Kaptein discusses the original 
meaning of “arms” in the context of the Second Amendment right to 
                                                          
 4. Why the text is being interpreted matters.  Accordingly, Willem B. Drees notes in his 
essay: 
The historians are not textualists.  They are text-oriented, but not textualists in the sense 
given to the term above.  If archaeological excavations or Hellenistic sources reveal facts 
relevant to the interpretation of passages of the Sermon on the Mount, it would be 
against the professional ethic to disregard such text-external evidence on the basis of a 
textualist preference. (51). 
 5. Tom Zwart notes: “Others, like Justice Scalia, who is the most prominent advocate of 
Originalism, will try to establish what the words meant to those living at the time that the 
Constitution was drafted.” (115). 
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bear arms.  Kaptein suggests that what arms means, for purposes of 
applying the term today, has to include the fact that the arms that the 
Founders referenced were not the type that, like modern weapons, could 
turn a single citizen-soldier into the equivalent of a small private militia. 
(161)  Issues like these are fascinating and raise the issue squarely: Does 
original meaning make sense as a method of interpretation for purposes 
of applying religious and legal texts to contemporary problems? 
The essays make clear that the reason a text is to be interpreted 
must matter to how it should be interpreted.  Justice Scalia considers 
interpreting texts in the fairly narrow context of enforcing legal rights. 
(12)  Some of the essayists quarrel with using original meaning in that 
context; others do not.  The essayists also critique using original 
meaning in other contexts.  Some suggest that interpreting a religious 
text in order to apply it to a contemporary problem may be different than 
interpreting a legal text to apply it to a contemporary social, political or 
ethical problem.  Almost all of the essayists touch on whether the 
original meaning of a religious or legal text ought to be used to resolve 
problems.  They reach varied conclusions.  For example, Paul Cliteur 
notes, “I defend that liberal interpretation is more appropriate in religion 
and theology (perhaps even inevitable) and textualism and originalism 
are more suitable for law.” (67)  However, Arie-Jan Kwak notes in the 
final essay that any authoritative text may lose its authority if it is 
interpreted merely to determine what it says rather than to determine 
how it ought to apply. (189)  The breadth of the analyses and 
conclusions of the authors makes the book fascinating. 
The issues that the essayists raise are thoroughly analyzed.  
However, the essayists do not address some issues that could have and 
arguably should have been addressed.  Certainly, declining to address 
the narrowest implications of Justice Scalia’s views about the U.S. 
Constitution is sensible.  However, additional pages could have been 
spent discussing differences between interpreting statutes and 
interpreting constitutions.  In his essay, Justice Scalia does not make a 
distinction between interpreting statutes and interpreting constitutions.  
However, given the essayists’ discussions of the import of the 
authoritative nature of the legal and religious texts at issue, it would 
seem reasonable to expect some significant analysis of possible 
differences between the authority of statutes and the authority of 
constitutions and how that might affect their interpretation.  Similarly, in 
the context of religious texts, noting and discussing a possible 
distinction between interpreting fundamental religious texts and 
interpreting canon law could have been fruitful.  Criticizing what was 
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left out of the book can easily devolve into a description of the book the 
reviewer might have written rather than a review of the book that was 
written.  However, there is one additional issue with respect to original 
meaning on which commentary from the essayists almost certainly 
would have been illuminating.  Original meaning is the meaning an 
average person would give to a text at the time the text was written or 
adopted.  This makes sense given that the people who chose to live 
under the relevant document made that choice at a certain time.  
However, a question arises: When is a document deemed adopted for 
purposes of its application to those who will live under it?  That question 
is important both for the U.S. Constitution and the Holy Bible.6 
The adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments—the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution—
arguably re-ratified the Constitution.  The nature of the Constitution was 
so radically changed by the adoption of those Amendments that one has 
to ask whether the original meaning of many parts of it—for purposes of 
applying it today—ought to be determined by what an average person in 
1787 thought the Constitution meant in 1787, or by what an average 
person in the immediate post-Civil War years thought the Constitution 
meant in 1787, or by what the average person in the immediate post-
Civil War years thought the Constitution meant in those years.  If the 
Constitution was thought to have been re-ratified in essence, original 
meaning arguably ought to focus on what the ratifiers in the immediate 
post-Civil War years thought they were re-ratifying.  This is not a 
variation on the theme of a Living Constitution; it is about determining 
the Constitution’s relevant original meaning.  Nonetheless, if the 
meaning of the Constitution during the immediate post-Civil War years 
becomes the original meaning, Justice Scalia’s vision of original 
meaning can merge somewhat with a vision of a Living Constitution. 
With respect to the Bible, the era of original meaning is important 
for determining how the Bible applies because the authority provided by 
the Bible for any group of adherents may depend on what they thought 
they were adopting.  That is, regardless of the original meaning of any 
particular book of the Bible, the question arguably is what the meaning 
of the Bible or any particular book of the Bible was at the time the group 
that determined which books were to go into the Bible made the decision 
to deem those books authoritative.  If a group of Christians who adopted 
the New Testament as an authoritative text thought it meant something 
                                                          
 6. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr. Biblical Interpretation, Constitutional Interpretation, and 
Ignoring Text, 69 MD. L. REV. 92 (2009). 
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different at the time they adopted it than its original meaning, 
presumably the group’s understanding of what the New Testament 
meant at the time they adopted it is what counts as original meaning for 
the purpose of interpreting the New Testament in the context of solving 
a contemporary problem from that group’s perspective.  This is not a 
semantic issue; it goes to the substance of what rules adherents agreed 
would bind them.  This issue went unexplored or, at least, 
underexplored.  The issue is arguably analyzed somewhat when the 
essayists consider whether original meaning is a legitimate method of 
interpretation when applying a text.  However, it was not analyzed from 
the perspective of how precisely to determine what original meaning is. 
In short, the book is very strong on many issues relating to the 
interpretation of legal and religious texts.  It is of value to law professors 
and law students.  Indeed, it is a wonderful read for anyone who wants a 
deep discussion of interpretative methods.  However, those who expect 
to read about how interpretative methods ought to be applied to the U.S. 
Constitution, given the book’s genesis with Justice Scalia’s work, may 
be disappointed.  This book only scratches the surface with respect to 
those issues. 
 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr. 
                                                          
  Professor of Law, University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia 
